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Abstract— Robotic research is often built on approaches that are
motivated by insights from self-examination of how we interface
with the world. However, given current theories about human
cognition and sensory processing, it is reasonable to assume
that the internal workings of the brain are separate from how
we interface with the world and ourselves. To amend some of
these misconceptions arising from self-examination this article
reviews human visual understanding for cognition and action,
specifically manipulation.
Our focus is on identifying overarching principles such as
the separation into visual processing for action and cognition,
hierarchical processing of visual input, and the contextual and
anticipatory nature of visual processing for action. We also
provide a rudimentary exposition of previous theories about
visual understanding that shows how self-examination can lead
down the wrong path.
Our hope is that the article will provide insights for the
robotic researcher that can help them navigate the path of self-
examination, give them an overview of current theories about
human visual processing, as well as provide a source for further
relevant reading.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major source of inspiration for works in robotics has
been the examination of different organisms, including hu-
mans. In modeling robotic cognition for human environ-
ments self-examination has been a guiding component. Self-
examination can, however, be a double-edged sword.
In robotics, vision has been the major modality used for
cognition and decisions regarding action. As vision is one of
our primary senses it is easy to draw conclusions from self-
examination of how we, ourselves, cognize about what we
see. Human vision research is full of examples of theories
that use ideas grounded in the workings of language and
how we interface with the world. However, current models
of human vision show to the contrary that the processing
of visual input is significantly different from how we use
vision and language to interface with the world. Fig. 1 gives
a simple illustration how one can approach the intersection
of language, vision, the world.
It is impossible to account for something as complex as
human visual understanding within one article. We will,
therefore, give a rough outline of current ideas of the
human brain’s object image processing system tied together
with models of internal object representation and how that
connects to action, specifically to grasping. As in-depth ex-
positions already exist [25], [71] our aim is to give a readily
available source explaining main principles, strategies, and
the structure of human visual understanding without too
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Fig. 1: Brain-World Interaction: One way of approaching
the brain-world interactions is by thinking of language as
an interface for the world. The brain receives sensory input,
interprets it dependent on the context and the number of
sensory inputs, mapping it into a concept. The concept is
then mapped into some relevant form in our consciousness
be it a word or awareness or an action command. The brain
does not, for example, count features of the object it sees
and then decides what it is seeing.
much of for the novice, confusing nomenclature used in
psychological and neuroscience research.
We start with a review of human visual processing following
the standard model of the two processing pathways one for
semantic object recognition and one for action, fig.2. We then
proceed to give a short review of prior models of human
visual understanding comparing to what self-examination
tells us. We compare these models to the current models of
humans vision, that is, recurrent, hierarchical processing of
visual input into an increasingly invariant and linearly separa-
ble feature space, and show how it accounts for the previous
models. Finally, we review vision for action. We show
how the object meaning influences action representation and
how that representation affects the grasping process. We
also review how intention, context, and the post-grasp task
influences human grasping and the visual processing.
Worth noting is that much of the understanding of the human
brain comes from research done on monkeys, and it is often
assumed that there are homologs, that is, equivalent func-
tional parts, in the human brain. We will follow this idea and
try to be clear about from where the experimental evidence
comes as this is not always evident in the literature.
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Action: Pet the dog.
Dorsal Stream
Ventral Stream
Identification: It is a dog.
Fig. 2: Simplified sketch of the division of labor between
the dorsal and ventral visual processing stream. The ventral
pathway is generally considered to answer questions about
what we see, while the dorsal pathway answers questions
about how we can perform an action on what we see.
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Fig. 3: Rough sketch of the visual processing in the brain
based on afigure in [76]. The visual input passes through the
LGN which combines the two visual streams and forwards
it to the back of the brain, the Occipital lobe, where the
primary visual cortex is located. The visual information flows
through area V1 and V2 and is then split into the dorsal
and ventral pathways. The dorsal pathway is thought to
process visual information related to action and is sent to the
parietal lobe for integration with other sensory information
and onwards to the primary motor cortex for execution of
actions. The ventral pathway ends in the Inferior Temporal
Cortex and is believed to process the visual information in
a hierarchical and increasingly complex fashion to facilitate
semantic understanding of the visual input.
II. HUMAN VISUAL PROCESSING
The most influential model of human image processing is that
of two anatomically and functionally distinct pathways, the
dorsal and ventral pathways [48] (fig.2). The dorsal named
the “how” pathway links to the motor system and is thought
to encode spatial information needed for interaction with the
world. The ventral stream, named the “what” pathway, is
thought to encode information for object recognition and
general visual perception.
The reason for the “how” label of the dorsal pathway is
that lesions, damaged tissue in the brain, in the ventral
and dorsal cortex of primates cause degradation in object
perception or spatial vision [113]. Additional evidence for the
distinction between the two pathways was a human subject,
D.F., with lesions in parts of the ventral pathway. D.F. had
impaired object recognition and could not recognize line-
drawings of objects but showed normal pre-shaping and
rotation of the hand when grasping objects implying that
location, orientation, size, and shape estimation of objects
was intact [59], [48]. [48] put forward that both streams
process the attributes of objects that are manipulated, but
for different purposes.
The distinction between the two pathways should be viewed
as a simplified model of visual processing in the brain. There
is plenty of evidence of information sharing between the
two. Much of the information encoded in each pathway is
used by the other in such things as shape perception, object
detection, and intentional visuomotor action [39], [49], [72],
[84], [107], [106], [116].
We can outline a general model of the current understanding
of visual processing under the two pathways as follows
(fig.2). The visual input from the retinas is sent to the lateral
geniculate nucleus (LGN) which combines the input from
the two retinas and their different receptors. It forwards
the visual stream to the primary visual cortex (V1) which
processes features such as orientation, direction, and color.
V1 forwards the information to area V2 where it splits into
the two pathways the ventral and dorsal.
The ventral pathway proceeds into area V4 and the inferior-
temporal (IT) cortex which is considered the end of the
ventral pathway. The IT contains several areas that activate
during visual input of among others faces, body parts, scenes,
and different shapes.
The dorsal pathway continues onto area V3 and the caudal
intraparietal area (CIP), and then onto the anterior intrapari-
etal cortex (AIP), ending in the primary motor cortex (M1),
thus transforming visual input into action. Apart from the
feed-forwarding the visual processing pathways also contain
feedback projections allowing earlier visual areas to receive
processed information from the later stages [68].
We illustrate and explain the flow of visual input and
processing more thoroughly in fig.4.
A. The Ventral Pathway
The ventral stream, the “what” pathway, is considered to
encode, among other things, information related to object
identity, that is, both category and specific object identity.
The word stream indicates a feed-forward visual processing
network. The predominant idea has been that the network
creates a hierarchy of more abstract representations further
down the stream which are increasingly invariant to trans-
lation and rotation. However, there is plenty of evidence
of connections between the early and later stages of visual
processing that indicates that visual processing is a process
of continuous refinement.
Recent models, therefore, point towards a recurrent and
highly interactive network. A review [68] suggest that the
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Fig. 4: Simplified structure of the visual processing of primates aggregated from [25], [71], [49], [22], [77], [33]. The
model is extremely simplified and the visual processing connects to many more areas than given here, in addition, there
are plenty of recurrent connections between the areas. For in-depth models see the referred papers. An approximate number
of neurons per area is shown beneath each area box for the ventral pathway (from [33]). Visual input flows from the two
retinas to the LGN where it is combined into one visual stream. The primary visual cortex (V1) computes features such as
edges, gratings, line endings, motion, color, and absolute disparity. The features in V2 are similar to the ones in V1 with
the addition of simpler contours and computation of relative disparity. In V2 the visual stream is split into the dorsal and
ventral pathways. The ventral stream goes onto V4 which computes features such as orientation, color, and simple shapes.
There is an increasing invariance and a luminance-invariant coding of hue. V4 also responds to contours from difference in
motion. V4 projects to the inferior temporal cortex (IT) which is responsible for among other things object categorization.
The dorsal stream continues on to V3 which computes color, shading, and 2D orientation. This information is forwarded
to the CIP which computes surface orientations, and disparity based and perspective based orientation cues. Features are
viewer-centered, local, and directed towards graspable features. The information in the CIP is forwarded to the AIP which
together with the PMv, which contains movement primitives for grasping movements, plans the grasping action.
network links information from at least six cortical and
subcortical systems such as early visual areas and areas
responsible for high-level representations. The feedforward
and feedback projections allow for efficient communication
between adjacent areas but also the early and late stages
of the visual processing. Evidence of sensitivity to retino-
topic position even for higher level representations indicates
that visual recognition is an ongoing process of contextual
calibration, that is, from directing attention, to categorical
and individual recognition, to putting the recognition into
its proper context. These recurrent connections are also
suggested as an explanation for the brain’s redundancy, that
is, the retained functionality even after extensive damage to
certain areas [68].
B. Human Object Representations
Models of human object representation range from neuropsy-
chological explanations that try to tie neurological evidence
with cognition to visual neuroscience that focuses on ex-
plaining vision through neural activity. Different models have
different strengths in explaining the various phenomena in
vision. Neuropsychological models make simplifications of
the processing in the ventral-dorsal stream to explain cogni-
tive abilities. Visual neuroscience models, on the other hand,
typically focus on explaining one specific phenomenon.
Accounting for all models and phenomena as well as exper-
imental evidence is beyond this paper. We will, therefore,
limit the focus to models concerning central abilities of
human object recognition - the ability to categorize, abstract,
and identify - starting with some of the major models from
neuropsychology.
A full model of human vision needs to explain viewpoint
invariance at the basic category level, that is, invariance
under the transformation of retinal position, scale, luminance,
deformation, clutter, context, etc. It also needs to account for
reduced viewpoint invariance for novel objects. Experiments
on humans and monkeys [77] show that recognition drops
for view disparities of depth-rotated objects larger than 30°.
However, when presented with two views 75°−120° apart the
monkeys interpolated them to give almost perfect recognition
for any view between the two.
Further on, a full model also needs to explain categoriza-
tion, abstraction of objects into invariant features, and the
generalization into prototypical representations of objects
in a category. Finally, it needs to account for different
levels of categorization for one and the same object. This
means, for example, being able to explain our ability to
discriminate between, canine, dog, Terrier, and a Terrier
named Rocky.
The abstraction of object features means decomposing ob-
jects into meaningful entities, categories of their own, and
their spatial relations, an internal ontology. These subordinate
categories are not necessarily necessary for categorization
of the object itself — but as discussed above — are im-
portant for reasoning and conveying information about a
category.
Identification means the ability to match visual input to a
specific object from memory. To complicate matters object
identity can be viewed as a sub-category with cardinality
one [95], [33]. If we would have one shared representation
for all object recognition it would need to account for all the
category memberships from superordinate to identity.
1) The Invariant Decomposable Parts Perspective: Early
theories of vision modeled objects as decomposable into
smaller invariant parts that preserved the relational structure,
but not the underlying metric between the parts [111]. Bie-
derman [15], for example, suggested decomposing objects
into geons, deformable, prototypical parts such as cones,
cuboids, cylinders, etc., that together with a relational struc-
ture can represent objects (fig. 5).
The decomposable part models as initially formulated were
not tied to any experimental data [88], [89]. We should
see them in the context of how we as humans reasons
and abstract objects to communicate about them. The major
criticism of the decomposable part model is its inability
to account for rotation, that is, invariant features and the
relational structure might not be detectable from a view oc-
cluding them but the object might still be identifiable. A de-
composable part based model must also account for the level
of granularity in the decomposition it needs to categorize the
object correctly which introduces additional complexity [77].
If we simplify and consider the deformable parts model a tree
graph then the number of possible graphs for n nodes will
grow exponentially as nn−2. Finally, further complications
arise from the segmentation and relational structuring having
to happen interchangeably as the parts need to be recognized
and fit into a relational structure.
Ideas of decomposition are not uncommon in computer
vision and have been applied with varying success. Common
approaches are Bag-of-Words models [29] and deformable
parts models [42]. Works in grasping have also used decom-
position strategies. [83] represented objects as decomposable
into a set of geometric primitives where each primitive has
known pre-planned grasps. And [2] represents objects as
graphs where they associate each node with a set of pre-
learned grasps.
2) The Multiple Viewpoints Perspective: A more recent
model of human object recognition, supported by psy-
chophysical and physiological data, is that of multiple view-
points [111], [95]. It opposes the ideas of invariance and
structure arguing that the brain instead store representations
of objects as a set of unique viewpoints (fig. 5).
The major criticism of the multiple viewpoints model is
that a small perturbation may cause a new viewpoint to
significantly differ from previously stored viewpoints. There-
fore, to form complete representations that can account for
recognition of novel viewpoints and mental rotations, the
viewpoints must be normalized and stitched together in some
fashion [111]. Another shortcoming is memory capacity.
Unless there is some generalization, filtering, or compression
process it is unclear which viewpoints should be stored for
future use. The recognition process is also difficult as the
brain, during recognition, needs to match a viewpoint to
viewpoint clusters of objects retained in memory.
3) The Prototype Perspective: A third related model is that
of prototypes (fig. 5), that is, the summarization of within-
category objects into a generalized model [34]. We can trace
this idea as far back as to Plato. To recognize an object,
the visual input is matched to prototypes that are kept in
memory, using an invariant distance measure. The prototype
model of vision has some support in experimental data.
For example, experiments involving distortions of a set of
simple patterns show that, when infants and adults are given
sufficient exemplars of a category, they tend to abstract these
into prototypical patterns [77].
Prototype models for vision are good at explaining abstrac-
tions. Yet, similarly to the decomposable parts models, they
are suspiciously close to how we abstract and communicate
about categories. In fact, experiments on categorization in
monkeys and humans show that the strategies involved in
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Fig. 5: Models of visual understanding. Deformable parts models, models objects into smaller invariant parts where the
relational structure is preserved, but where the underlying metric between the parts is not. Here a human is represented as a
set of cylinders in a relational structure. Prototype models, models objects as the summarization of within-category objects
into a generalized model. These prototypes can take one different granularity depending on the need e.g. pictogram vs. a
more human-like model. Mulitple viewpoints models, models objects as the association or stitching together of multiple
viewpoints of an object. A novel object is then matched to a viewpoint cluster.
subordinate categorization tasks are most likely explained
by referring to category exemplars rather than prototype
similarity [88].
Prototypes models have problems in accounting for scaling,
rotation, and translation when matching the image to stored
prototypes as these operations are all very taxing for biolog-
ical systems [100]. Prototypes are also inherently coded for
generalization. This means that a prototype based system will
use many different prototypes for different generalizations
under different contexts ranging from the ability to depict
individual exemplars to summarizing basic categories. This
leads to the same problems faced by the multiple viewpoints
model an explosion in the number of prototypes.
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Fig. 6: Hiearchial Transformations Models. The visual
input passes through the visual cortex, which performs
complex multidimensional transformations making the trans-
formed input increasingly invariant and specific. For basic
categorization, the model in [33] suggest a final representa-
tion that is linearly separable as illustrated in the figure.
4) Recent Ideas - Representational Transformations: Recent
ideas of visual understanding focus on tying together the
neural aspect of vision with higher-level cognition. Models
of vision in computational biology are similar in spirit to
the deep neural networks models used in machine learning.
They characterize image recognition as a computational feed-
forward hierarchal network ending in the inferior temporal
cortex (IT) which is generally considered the end of the
ventral pathway [115], [95], [32], [33], [58], [91], [109],
[108], [100].
The feedforward network continuously refines the retinal
images through linear and nonlinear transformations into
complex multidimensional representations that are increas-
ingly invariant to the position on the retina [95] (fig.6). The
feedforward network model is essentially a version of the
multiple viewpoints model which has replaced the stitching
mechanism by transformations that facilitate categorization
and identification by separation in space.
The transformations of these models vary from model to
model. In [33] they are both high-dimensional and low-
dimensional projections correlating size wise with the neu-
ronal populations of the different cortices in the ventral
pathway. The authors suggest that each neuronal subpopula-
tion tries to achieve a transformation, using nonlinear func-
tions such as logical-gates, max-pooling, and thresholding
of neuronal firing rates. These transformations flatten the
object manifold together with some form of learning rule that
concentrates the response to input areas where the object is
usually found. The final representation is an untangling of the
object manifolds that make them separable by a hyperplane
[32]. The model learns the parameters in an unsupervised
fashion from the temporal contiguity of objects on the retina.
We can find these construction principles in some form or
other in most hierarchical models e.g. [100].
The descriptors produced by these models must account
for the different phenomena observed in human vision as
outlined previously, as well as the speed of human basic
image categorization which is less than 200 ms [95], [33].
One way of evaluating these computational models of human
vision is on standard computer vision benchmark datasets.
However, it has been argued that these datasets are difficult
to use for evaluating promising models since they have low
variation in viewpoint, position, size, etc., both for intra-
class and between-class categories, and contain contexts that
covary with the object category [91], [100].
These models build on neurological evidence that recognition
is not done by matching to a single neuron but to a range of
them. Neurons in IT seems to encode features such as shape
and other low-level properties of the object rather than a
complete representation [7] and [33] notes that the weighted
sum of intervals of spiking patterns appears to be enough to
explain object pose variations.
Additional findings in studies of primates [19], show that for
familiar objects some of the neurons will encode viewpoint
invariant information, responding to all views of an object
and that most other neurons respond to specific viewpoints.
The authors hypothesize that the view-dependent neurons
form associated clusters that influence certain neurons to
become view-invariant. These object responsive neurons then
allow for rapid object recognition for familiar objects.
Recordings of IT neurons in monkeys also show that increas-
ing familiarity with an object correlates with an increase in
neurons encoding for the object [89], [19]; implying that
familiarity refines the internal representation. Experiments
on primates have also shown the plasticity of neurons in the
temporal cortex when exposed to novel stimuli of the same
category. In the experiment, monkeys were first exposed to
familiar faces 5-15 times where the recorded neurons showed
a stable response. When introduced to novel faces the same
recorded neurons altered their response to a relative degree.
This flexibility in altering the response suggests that category
encodings are continuously updated in a rapid fashion to
improve categorization [115].
From a machine learning perspective, the idea of feature
invariance and multiple views are not a dichotomy. The
untangling will by necessity have to discard features that are
not relevant. Multiple views of the same or similar objects are
actually necessary to find the most efficient untangling. The
untangled representations will have to be close in space for
it to be useful. From this perspective, the normalization and
interpolation of the multiple viewpoints model will not be
a problem since the untangling will automagically facilitate
it. It is important to note that the multiple viewpoints of an
object are not stored per se but it is the parameters of the
network that are the compressed storage form.
The hierarchal nature of the networks also makes it possible
to form different representations for different tasks. For
example, subordinate categories can be represented higher up
in the hierarchy since they need fine-grained discrimination.
It is also not inconceivable that the brain uses these represen-
tations to build the prototypes and parts-based models that
we use as abstractions when reasoning about categories. For
a discussion on the advantages of feature hierarchy systems
see [100].
C. Embodied Cognition - Categories & Semantic Mem-
ory
An important part of object understanding is the semantic
memory, that is, facts, ideas, and concepts that we can
recall at an instance. In its most straightforward form, this
manifests itself as a deeper understanding of the meaning of
words, for example, objects and their properties. Storing of
such information does not come as discrete entities, as the
number of categories is infinite. The semantic memory is,
therefore, best characterized by parsimonious, flexible, inter-
twined, and shared feature spaces of overlapping categories
[81].
A large body of evidence suggests that the brain stores
properties of objects close to where the functional unit
for recognizing them are [81], [80]. For example, color is
stored close to or in the area of the brain responsible for
the perception of color and knowledge about tool use is
stored close to or in motor-related regions. This means that
category and object-specific information should come from
a weighted accumulation of information from the different
property-based regions [80]. This accumulation is suggested
to converge in high-level convergence zones that are far away
from the primary sensorimotor cortices [16].
Experiments show that mentioning words denoting objects
triggers activity in areas of the brain where it first learned the
properties of the object. Memories can thus be triggered by
reactivation of the neural pattern elicited when learning about
the object. Greatly simplified, this implies that the concept
of, for example, a cat triggers the sensor modalities that
involves the recognition of a cat. Further on, concepts can
have different meanings given the current context, implying
that they should be dependent on the convergence of different
sensor modalities.
Some researchers have in light of this proposed models of
the brain as performing mental simulations when cognizing
[44], [8]. This idea is backed up by evidence of mirror
neurons [97]. Mirror neurons are neurons that activate when
we think about a task, see or hear a word denoting a task, and
when we see someone else perform the task. For example,
seeing someone perform a grasping action invokes areas in
the brain of the perceiver associated with motor commands
of grasping, even mirroring the specific grasp that the person
is performing.
Given this, and plenty more experimental evidence [9], it
has been argued that to understand a concept we must
ground the meaning in sensorimotor input and that the
actual understanding of a concept is, in fact, sensorimotor
simulation. This idea is usually referred to as the embodied
cognition hypothesis or grounded cognition [9], [10], [44],
[81], [92], where cognition according to this model manifests
itself in form of simulations, situated action, and bodily states
[9]. In essence, this is a model for solving the symbolic
grounding problem [53].
[66], [92] argues that concepts, as physically realized in the
brain, are distributed representations connected via action-
perception circuits (APC) that links the necessary sensori-
motor modalities and higher convergence areas. The APCs
are learned through exploration by finding correlates in
congruent activation of sensor modalities.
Critics of grounded cognition come from the traditional cog-
nitivist viewpoint. They consider concepts as amodal, that is,
abstract symbols separate from the sensorimotor system. We
can think of the separation as a cognizing unit manipulating
symbols for planning and a sensorimotor system infusing
the symbols with meaning. For example, [79] argues that
sensorimotor activation can be epiphenomenal, a byproduct
of symbolic manipulation. Patients with lesions in motoric
regions can for example reason about the concept of a
tool even though they are not able to use it. As such, the
amodal viewpoint is that the abstract concept triggers the
sensorimotor simulations.
Nonetheless, studies of patients with various types of motor
damage show impairment in comprehending action words
such as tool use. [16] suggest that the sensorimotor acti-
vations are hierarchical, modular, situational, and frequency
dependent. We can then explain the double dissociation1
given above, that is often used as an argument against
embodied cognition, as a degradation in the functionality of
the structure. For a recent discussion on the topic of amodal
and embodied cognition see [10].
1) The Dorsal Pathway: The dorsal pathway processes vi-
sual input for action, parsing objects and scenes in a person-
centered reference frame. Research on vision has mainly
concerned itself with cognition and not how vision guides
action [47], [49]. Understanding the processing of vision for
action is therefore not as developed as that of vision for
cognition.
Current understanding of the dorsal stream is similar to the
model of the ventral stream as a series of transformations
of the visual input to representations that facilitate action
planning and execution. Some have even suggested that
features in the dorsal pathway are computed in a feedforward
hierarchy similar to the ventral pathway [101]. The visual
inputs flow from V1 to V2, and on to V3, that projects to
areas involved in action planning and execution. The visual
flow is illustrated in fig.4
More recent models of the dorsal pathway suggest that
1If damage X to the brain affects functionality A but not functionality B
and damage Y does not affect functionality A but affects functionality B
then the parts of the brain associated with these functionalities are consid-
ered to be double dissociated. Double dissociation is stronger evidence of
the independence of location in the brain of these different functionalities.
it gives rise to three distinct pathways supporting spatial
working memory, visually guided action, and spatial navi-
gation [69]. The three pathways, parieto-prefrontal, parieto-
premotor, and parieto-medial temporal, all found in the pos-
terior parietal cortex integrates information from the central
and peripheral visual fields, forming reference frames relative
to the body and to the eyes. The pathways connect a range
of functions such as spatial working memory, the top-down
guidance of eye-moment, optical flow, depth information,
world and object space reference frames, navigation, and the
reaching and grasping of objects [69].
The dorsal stream is generally not thought to encode for
objects in a view-invariant manner as in the ventral stream.
However, see [39] for a review of the evidence of viewpoint
invariance in the dorsal stream, as well as a discussion on
different cues processed in the two streams and their integra-
tion in object perception and understanding. Viewpoints in
the dorsal stream are instead interpreted as different objects
[60]. They are not parsed for global contextual interpretation
as in the ventral stream but provide an encoding that favors
ease of visuomotor transformations for tracking, reaching,
and grasping [25]. This sensitivity to viewpoint makes sense
since grasping is an object centered action. The dynamics
and the local shape of the object are central to physically
performing the reaching and grasping action. However, as we
shall see contextual information plays a big role in planning
and choosing which motor commands to perform.
2) Ventral Stream Influence on Grasp Planning: As outlined
above, the dorsal processing concerns itself with visuospatial
transformations used for actions such as grasping, disre-
garding semantic knowledge. The ventral pathway, on the
other hand, is thought to only influence motor planning
indirectly.
Experiments with the patient D.F. showed, for example,
inability to infer properties of size, shape, and orientation
verbally or manually but showed normal pre-shaping and
rotation of the hand when grasping objects [59]. This and
other studies have been taken as evidence for the separation
into the two different representations catering to action and
conceptual understanding.
The observations from D.F. are not all consistent with the
idea of perception-action separation. For example, D.F. did
not use visual cues when modulating grasp force something
which would have had to come from the ventral pathway as
this should be highly dependent on the object and its material
[107]. Further on, D.F’s ability to grasp objects correctly are
reliant on a specific set of visual cues, and when those cues
were perturbed she would fail more frequently than healthy
subjects. In [107] the authors argue that this is evidence that
the ventral stream processes additional depth and distance
cues which are then used in the grasping process. This is
echoed in a review by [86]. There the authors suggest that
the dorsal pathway encodes primarily for absolute disparity
while the ventral system is concerned with relative disparity.
[105] argues further that observations of the dorsal and
ventral streams should be built on the premise of integration
instead of separation. They argue that D.F.’s degradation
should be seen as if she lost specific visual cues that are
reliable under certain circumstances and tasks. As such she
would have to rely on the accumulation of less reliable cues
to guide recognition and action.
Yet in recent experiments on binocular disparity in macaque
monkeys, it is concluded that relative disparity exists in both
visual streams, although serving different purposes [70]. The
authors propose that the ventral stream uses relative disparity
to judge the shape of objects. This would explain D.F.’s trou-
bles in discerning spatially adjacent surfaces since relative
disparity is more accurate than absolute [93]. The dorsal
stream uses relative disparity to aid in the segmentation of
moving features. This implies that interaction with static
objects relies on ventral stream information for more delicate
manipulation.
There is further evidence of dorsal-ventral cross-talk. An
fMRI study [3] found somatosensory activation in parts of
the ventral pathway implying that tactile information might
be coupled with visual object knowledge. Others have found
that recognition of tool use integrates information both from
object attributes stored in the ventral stream and from motor-
based properties in the dorsal stream [24] in accordance
with the idea that memory of categories and attributes are
stored close to the area for detection [81]. Areas close
to the AIP, the area that is responsible for transforming
visuospatial features into hand configurations, are also active
during action and objection recognition which means they
might provide information about functional properties of the
object. Further on, a recent analysis of fMRI data found that
the ventral pathway responds to weight or textural density
as part of the visual processing for grasping [45].
For reviews and discussions on the ventral and dorsal sepa-
ration see [47], [107], [105].
D. Summary
The prevalent model of human vision is that of the two
pathways, one for conceptual understanding answering what
it is we see, and one for action answering how we should do
what we want to do. One should not view the separation as
absolutely distinct as there is plenty of evidence of crosstalk
that helps solve the how or what questions, [47], [107],
[105].
The ventral pathway performs basic level categorization.
It is modeled as a feedforward network where represen-
tations along the network are refined along the cortical
visual areas, becoming more invariant to scale, luminance,
position, etc. The feedforward models are based on a schema
of neuronal functionality and the idea of temporal firing
rates as representations. Despite their intuitive and simple
form, the basic feedforward networks only model a fraction
of visual understanding. Visual cognition requires constant
recalibration in the form of attention and refinement implying
that a complete model of vision will have to take into account
the existing feedback projections along the ventral pathway.
It will also have to go beyond basic recognition explaining
abstraction, deeper visual understanding, etc. There is plenty
of arguments against framing visual understanding as solely
consisting of object recognition [26].
Further on, converging evidence points to that humans
ground concepts in sensorimotor input in some form or
other, as opposed to being amodal. The grounded concepts
bridges object properties with possible affordances and motor
programs that perform the affordance.
The dorsal pathway handles spatial understanding for inter-
acting with objects. It transforms visual input into represen-
tations for planning and execution of actions in the motor
cortex. Representations in the dorsal pathway are in general
not view-invariant and the dorsal pathway does not store
representations of graspable objects for long, most probably
due to the temporal aspect of actions.
There is plenty of evidence of cross-talk between the two
streams where representations in the ventral pathway are
thought to influence, for example, grasp planning and other
activities reliant on semantic knowledge.
III. HUMAN GRASPING
Neuroscience has yet to solve, on a broader level, how
perceptual inputs guide actions [23]. There is a large body
of work on prehension in monkeys [96], however, the human
physiology and everyday actions are somewhat different from
monkeys, and the putative homologs in humans are still not
fully understood [22]. We give a simplified outline of the
visual processing for grasping in primates in fig.4. For an
in-depth exposition of the areas in the brain, that are active
during grasping, and the flow of information see [25].
The visual information in grasping comes majorly from the
dorsal stream. V3 projects into the intraparietal sulcus (IPS).
Experiments on macaques show that the IPS processes visual
stream for action-perception coordination [50], that is, arm
and eye movements. The IPS contains the caudal intraparietal
sulcus (CIP) which process 3D features, axis, and surface
orientation, from the information in V3, in a view-centered
manner [25].
CIP connects to the anterior intraparietal area (AIP) which is
thought to be central to grasp planning. Neurons in the AIP
discharge during object manipulation, object observation,
and even to be sensitive to manipulation during dark and
light luminance conditions. [30] found that AIP neurons, in
monkeys, respond preferentially to specific manipulations of
specific objects in addition to being selective for shape, size,
and orientation.
The AIP is thus thought to perform visuomotor transforma-
tions of forwarded visuospatial object features. It transforms
these features, such as surface orientation in depth and
texture gradients into grasp plans which it then forwards to
the motor cortex for execution. The AIP is also active during
the grasping process where the evidence points to it being
critical for monitoring and recalibrating grasp movements
[25].
The AIP connects to the premotor cortex. Part of the pre-
motor cortex is the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) which
contains area F5. F5 fires during specific object-related
hand movements and in the presence of a 3D object [50].
Recordings also show some F5 neurons discharging for end-
state goals [98]. Experiments in [96] found sets of neurons
discharge in these regions during specific types of prehensile
movements suggesting that these combinations of neurons
are a motor vocabulary for elementary motor acts. The first
discovery of mirror neurons was in F5. Experiments showed
activation in F5 when a Macaques was observing other actors
perform grasp actions.
PMv neurons in monkeys are selective for the type of re-
quired prehension for grasping an object, that is, the grasping
action as a whole not controlling for the individual digits,
together with the applied force. Experiments on monkeys
have in fact found a striking accuracy, 89%, in predicting
grasping actions based on the activity in the premotor cortex
[49], see also [38].
The PMv receives information from the AIP and is thought
to output a representation activating motor programs of the
object affordance which is then combined with other visual
cues to configure and orient the hand. This information
is then forwarded to the primary motor cortex (M1) for
execution [23], [49].
fMRI studies also suggest that the human homolog of the
PMv integrates additional modalities such as somatosensory
[35]. The authors suggest that there are different areas
responsible for precision and power grips, where precision
grips might use somatosensory information from the poste-
rior parietal cortex. The use of more tactile information in
precision grips is sensible. They tend to be complex and fol-
lowed by in-hand manipulation which is much more reliant
on tactile feedback. In addition, [35] also found that precision
and power grips activate different parts of the human cortex.
The precision grip activated a larger combination of cortical
areas especially the PMv while power grips associated more
with M1. This seems to be in accordance with the notion that
precision grasps require more planning and coordination than
power grips.
A. Grasp Planning and Execution
Human grasping can be characterized by a set of phases
[78].We illustrate the grasping movement in fig.7.
The first phase is concerned with finding a suitable plan of
execution. In general, this means choosing a grasp position
on the object, pairing it with an initial estimate of the hand
configuration that will fit the local geometry of the object,
and then adding the proper motor commands that involve the
reaching and grasping movement.
The second phase involves executing the motor commands
for the reaching movement and pre-shaping of the hand to
comply with the local geometry of the object at the chosen
grasp position. During this phase, there is a continuous
recalibration of the trajectory and the hand configuration,
where the hand reaches a maximum aperture around 60-70%
through the reaching movement correlating with the size of
the object [22].
The third phase is during and at contact with the object where
hand reconfigurations are made to stabilize and maintain the
grasp. This phase is dominated by the aggregation of sensor
modalities such as tactile, visual, auditory, and proprioceptive
working together to give feedback about the stability of the
grasp and how that stability is maintained.
We will concern ourselves with the initial phase, the plan-
ning, as this articles’ main focus is on how the visual
understanding influences the grasp planning process.
B. Effects of Task and Object Properties on Grasp Plan-
ning
Many factors affect the planning of a grasp. The post-grasp
task, that is, what one intends to do with the object, is
central to planning with respect to the reaching movement
[5], [36], hand configuration [85], [102], placement [61],
and the applied load and prehensile force upon contact
[43]. In addition, the properties of the object also affect
grasp planning, placement, and load forces. Apart from the
shape of the object, estimations of dynamics, weight, and
texture are the predominant factors in planning, through
slow-changing priors that guide the initial plans. We give
a number task-specific grasps in fig.8 to illustrate how task
might affect grasp placement.
C. Task & Semantic Memory
Human grasp planning is seemingly preemptive in that it con-
tinuously updates and computes potential grasping actions
and affordances [13]. Before initializing the grasping action
the eyes typically focus its attention on parts of the scene that
it anticipates being the focus of an action. Experiments show
that the eyes fixate on a set of landmarks that are central
to the task [63]. These landmarks are most likely used to
anticipate potential grasp configurations and actions.
Once set on a target object for grasping, experiments show
that the eye fixations show a preference for regions where
the brain intends to place the index finger of the grasping
hand indicating hand-eye coordination in planning [13]. [13]
even suggest that it might be possible to predict which object
manipulation is about to take place given the current fixation
point and object.
This anticipatory behavior also manifests itself as subcon-
scious computations of potential actions for objects found in
Fig. 7: A sequence of snapshots of the reaching movement for grasping a cylinder-shaped object. Notice how the pre-shape
develops, with the grasp aperture increasing during the reaching movement, correlating with the shape of the object, and
then decreases as the hand reaches the object. We also note that the actor places the grasp at the mid-section on the object
as to get a stable grasp for picking up the object as opposed to if the actor intended to give the object to someone where a
top-grasp would be more convenient.
the vicinity. In a series of experiments, [112] showed that
humans using different grasp types to signal the category
of objects had faster response time with object compatible
grasps. This led the authors to suggest that the brain also rep-
resent objects in general motor responses that are potentiated
irrespective of the agent’s intentions, that is, the brain is sub-
consciously computing potential action possibilities.
A later fMRI study [51] showed grasp types compatible
with the object indeed activated the parietal, dorsal premotor,
and inferior frontal cortex. Another fMRI study by [24],
where participants named the categories of pictures depicting
objects, also showed activation in ventral premotor areas,
specifically for pictures of tools. These motor response
representations led the authors of [37], [112] to coin the term
micro-affordances to denote possible grasping actions not
necessarily involved in just one type of affordance.
Planning of the grasp also considers the post-grasp dynamics.
Experiments show that at least for simpler tasks [55], the
chosen grasp is part of a broader strategy for maximizing
control at the end of the task sequence, a so-called “end-
state comfort”. This effect has been shown in a range of
works from Rosenbaum and others [102], [54].
The initial realization came from observing a waiter filling
glasses with water. The waiter grasped an upside-down
standing glass with the thumb in the direction of the opening
of the glass, rotated it, filled it with water, and put it down,
thumb facing up. Rosenbaum noted, that the waiter chose
the initial awkward posture for a less awkward post-grasp
posture. After initial experiments, the optimization strategy
was named the end-state comfort effect. Further analysis,
however, indicated that humans choose grasps that optimize
the control exerted over the grasped object when it is most
needed. Additional experiments involving handing-over of
objects showed that humans choose awkward postures to
enable the receiver to perform an action with the object.
The actor thus actively takes another actor’s intentions into
account.
Task also affect the speed of the reaching movement and
hand shaping [65], [5]. Experiments involving grasping the
same object for different tasks [5] showed that when the
end task required greater control the pre-shaping was more
gradual and the reaching movement of the hand was much
slower. In the simpler end task, the subjects formed the hand
shape directly to comply with the place for a grasp while in
the complex task, the pre-shaping happened gradually during
the reaching movement. In sequent experiments, [4] showed
that using the same object but for different actions affected
reaching duration such that it was markedly slower if no
task followed the grasp. These results suggest, again, that the
grasp planning anticipates the end-state. The authors explain
the longer reaching time for the no-task grasp as relying more
on tactile feedback as opposed to when there is a post-grasp
task that requires planning and taking dynamic constraints
into account.
Grasp placement for more complex tasks also appears to
involve semantic memory. [28] showed in experiments, in-
volving objects with handles rotated in different orientations,
that when the subjects were simultaneously involved in a
memory retrieval task they tended to pick up the object by
the nearest point regardless of the distance to the handle.
However, when the memory retrieval task only involved
spatial or verbal working memory components, the subjects
the grasps landed on the handles with higher likelihood
regardless of orientation.
These findings indicate the importance of memory retrieval
for performing more complex grasping procedures. It also
implies that humans perform the simple act of reaching and
grasping automatically without the involvement of semantic
memory. Additional evidence of the involvement of memory
in the grasping process comes from [82]. The authors showed
that objects of familiar size modified both reaching and hand
amplitude. This effect was even greater when they removed
binocular cues implying an increase in reliance on memory
cues.
Representations in the brain of objects are also affected by
task [52], [21], [114]. [52] performed an fMRI study of
twenty-five subjects that carried out six different tasks that
required judging physical properties: fixation, color, tilt, or
conceptual properties: content, movement, size. First, they
showed the subjects an object and then tasked them with
judging a property of the object. The study showed that the
task context strongly affected the response in the ventral
pathway such that it was easier to decode which object
the subjects judged within a task compared to across-task.
This was also taken as further evidence of the top-down
modulation of visual processing as the task affected object
processing.
Similar experiments in [114] showed that task affected pro-
cessing in the dorsal stream while the ventral stream was less
affected and where the early visual regions showed a higher
encoding for category than task. Further on, the experiments
also showed that the filtering out of salient task-irrelevant
features was greater in the dorsal pathway indicating the
stream’s relevance for parsing visual input into action.
D. Shape
The shape of the object affects grasp placement by deter-
mining the center of gravity as well as offering places for
support. For example, in fig. 8 it is easy to see how the
pinky finger uses the curvature of the bottle as a stabilizing
factor. Experiments in [103] on two differently shaped plastic
water bottles involving the task of pouring and moving
exposed effects of task and object properties on the grasp
performance. The bottles used in the experiment consisted
of one ordinary cylindrical shaped bottle and one bottle with
concave constriction similar to the bottle in fig.8. The bottles
were either half-full or full.
In the experiments, the subjects grasped the full bottles
higher up than the half-full and more internally towards
the center of gravity. The same effect was observed for the
pouring actions versus the moving action. The grasps made
for pouring were placed higher up and more towards the
center of gravity. The shape affected the grip apertures by
generating smaller apertures for the moving action of the full
concave bottle. Task also affected the movement time where
the moving action was faster than pouring.
These results are evidence of the anticipatory nature of
grasping. The grasp planning phase clearly took into consid-
eration both the shape, in terms of the digit placement, and
the estimated weight of the bottles, to determine how they
would affect the post-grasp task. The authors suggested that
the reason for the moving action eliciting a faster reaching
movement is likely due to it requiring less precision and
calibration.
Similar experiments in [5], involving placing an object inside
differently sized niches, also showed this effect. The reaching
movements made for niches that required less precision were
faster and the pre-shaping of the hand reached its final shape
almost immediately opposed to the grasps for niches that
required more precision. This is in line with the fMRI results
[35] described earlier which showed that precision grips
generate larger neuronal activity compared to power grips.
This is sensible as demanding post-grasp tasks are more
difficult to plan and are likely to require more recalibration
during the reaching movement.
Additional evidence of how task affects digit placement
comes from experiments in [27]. The experiments involved
pouring and lifting a common glass juice bottle and showed
that the task and the weight of the bottle significantly affected
digit placement. For example, the pouring task consistently
showed greater distance between thumb and index finger,
something the authors suggest was to facilitate the rotating
movement of the bottle. We have illustrated a similar grasp
Fig. 8: Task-specific grasps for the tasks: drinking, drinking, giving, giving, picking up, pouring. Clearly, task is the major
factor in deciding approach vector, grip position, and grip configuration. Notice also how the pinky finger in the first two
images acts as stabilizing factor by being situtated underneath the curvature of the bottle. A grasp higher up without the pinky
finger stabilitziation will be much more unstable. We mostly likely learn this type of stabilization by repeated interaction
implying that this type of grasp is to some extent reliant on semantic memory.
in fig.8 where the two first images indicate the stabilization
factor by the pinky finger. Further on, the first and last images
show the difference in distance between thumb and index
finger digits for a power grasp and a precision grasp.
Shape is also a factor when computing the applied grip
force. [62] showed in a set of experiments of precision
grips on an object, which changed curvature unpredictably
between trials, that humans use the curvature and kinematics
estimated by vision to predict the required movements and
grip forces that produce a stable grasp. The experiments also
showed that anesthesia had little impact on the adaptation of
the grip force indicating that visual cues are the predominant
variable in grip force estimation. However, vision was of
little help to the anesthetized subjects in modulating the grip
forces to balance friction. This implies that past the contact
phase tactile feedback is the biggest factor in modulating the
grip force.
E. Size and Material
A classic experiment by primary school physics teachers
is to show two objects of different size and material, and
ask which falls the fastest. Whereupon most students, not
familiar or sometimes even familiar with the laws of gravity,
answers the larger or by material seemingly heavier one.
Priors on object weight also play an important role in
computing load forces needed for lifting and performing
actions with objects.
Humans base their prior on the size and material of the
object. Experiments involving objects whose surface displays
a material different from the interior showed that subjects
misjudged weight and applied erroneous load forces. [11],
[20] tasked humans with lifting cubes of varying sizes,
and with different surface and interior materials (brass and
wood in [11], and metal, wood, and expanded polystyrene in
[20]). The experiments showed that the subjects frequently
misjudged object weight but learned to adapt the load force
after a couple of additional interactions.
Interestingly, the prior on object weight in these experiments
was seemingly stable and did not update with new infor-
mation. The subjects consistently made errors when judging
object weights even after receiving feedback and being asked
about the object weight again. The applied load force, on the
other hand, started to adapt after the first trial. The authors
suggest that humans rely on two distinct representations
for estimating weights. A slow-changing material-density-
volume prior that we use for initial estimates of object
weight. When the prior proves to be wrong the estimates
tend to shift and rely to a greater extent on a combination
of priors and sensorimotor memory.
A recent analysis of fMRI data supports the idea of these
types of priors. It showed the ventral pathway responding to
weight or textural density as part of the visual processing for
grasping, and that these associations, in fact, are learnable
[45].
Size, material, and dynamic priors are especially valuable
when placing precision grips. Precisions grips require com-
plex interaction between different load forces. They must
predict both weight and friction between the fingertips and
the object to prevent slippage as well as predict the dynamic
behavior of the object under load forces. These types of pri-
ors have led to suggestions that humans form internal models
of object dynamics. 2. Sometimes with enough training, the
dynamic model even becomes specific to a single object
[43].
Many of the approaches for stability prediction in robotic
grasping have usually assumed knowledge of friction con-
stants etc. These approaches are obviously not tenable and
the trend is towards data-driven methods e.g. [12], [75], [1],
[99]. However, the lack of reliability and resolution in robotic
tactile sensors compared to humans leaves only so much
room for improvement in the sophistication of the control
and learning algorithms.
F. Heuristics
Experimental evidence shows that humans view objects in
a holistic manner but when grasping they ignore features
that are not pertinent to placing the grasp [47]. These results
suggest that there are heuristics involved in grasp planning
and that we can explain them in specific features of the
object.
A study [40], [41] of four professionals manual laborers
analyzed 7770 instances of object-task grasps of roughly 306
objects for 231 tasks collected during an 8-hour window.
The analysis of a decision tree classifier fitted to the data
showed 47% classification accuracy for grasp type for the
attributes: dimension, mass, roundness, functional class, task
constraint, grasped dimension, force, and rigidity. The most
discriminative of the recorded features in predicting grasp
type were: object dimension, task constraints - the degrees
of freedom in rotating and translating the object, and the
mass of the object.
That object dimension is a good discriminator comes as no
surprise. Most tools are, for example, elongated and usually
has a handle that requires a specific grasp. Analysis of the
data, in fact, showed that the subjects had a clear tendency
to grasp objects along the smallest dimensions of the object.
The constraints features are also logical as manual labor
involves repetitive tasks with specific objects with specific
grasps.
2See [1] for a deep learning approach to learning robots to develop similar
models.
Another interesting aspect of the study is that the combina-
tion of object and task constraints increased the classification
accuracy significantly compared to either feature alone. This
is clear evidence that categorization of required grasps needs
to include both object features and features involved in the
action. It is also evidence of the significant involvement
and interplay of action with the object category and how
the affordance of an object shapes how we categorize and
cognize about it.
In another recent study [38], participants grasped objects
that varied in size, elongation, and shape, using grasps with
different combinations of digits plus passively viewing the
objects. fMRI recordings of the subjects showed that the
feature that was coded strongest for in the different brain
regions was elongation followed by shape and size. The
authors suggest that this reflects the importance of dimension
in selecting grip configuration and wrist orientation. In
addition, the results showed that the number of digits used
in a grasp was a better model for explaining the activations
than the type of precision grasp.
The above results show that simple features of an object
might be enough to derive simple heuristics for classification
and grasp planning that work well in a majority of cases.
In the subsequent chapters, we will explore this idea by
formulating a stack of simple features and try to learn from
the data which feature works best.
G. Summary
We can decompose grasping into a set of phases summarized
as planning, reaching, and contact. The planning phase is
preemptive in that the mind consistently is anticipating and
computing action possibilities, and their associated motor
programs for objects in the surrounding. The planning is also
preemptive in that it tries to predict the end-state of the task
such that the grasp maximizes control over the object.
Apart from the task, placement, and force in grasp plan-
ning depend on a number of properties of the object. The
properties are first and foremost shape, material, and size.
Humans learn slow-changing priors of how materials respond
to interaction. The elongation and size of an object are
good predictors for how and where a human will place
affordance-based grasps implying possible underlying heuris-
tics for placing grasps. On the whole, the accumulated
evidence suggests a complex interaction between factors
of weight, material, shape, and task. Further on, it shows
that humans are efficient at exploiting and estimating the
involved factors to plan stable grasps that anticipate future
manipulation.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
It has been argued that,
vision began not as a system for perceiving the
world, but as a system for the distal control of
movement [47]
This idea contrasts strikingly with the research done in
computer vision which has focused mainly on answering
the what question. The main reason for this is most likely
the effort involved in obtaining labeled data. Answering
what is also less ambiguous than answering how in that
categorization is a binary question while how spans complex
interactions of body, object, and outcomes. It may also be
that what is something that involves everyday conscious
decisions and often is explainable in the rule-based counting
of features, meanwhile, how is subconscious and thus more
complicated to explain explicitly. This shows itself in that
learning of actions are primarily done by imitation and
sensorimotor exploration.
The focus on answering what has influenced the creation of
many vision-based grasping approaches in form of feature
representation and by forcing the problem into a form
suitable for vision-based discrimination, e.g. [104], [73],
[64], [94]. The division of labor in human vision is a strong
indication that robots should use different features for action
and recognition. Features for grasping, for example, needs
to be less focused on saliency and more focused on shape
and material, and how the visual understanding of shape and
material relates to the gripper configuration and force space.
Data for learning features should come from interactions
with shape and materials and will require more exploratory
approaches as well as learning from demonstration.
This is already being explored to some extent. In [74] the
authors let a set of robots perform 800 000 grasp attempts
and uses the data to learn hand-eye coordination for monocu-
lar images using reinforcement learning with a convolutional
neural network. [1] hypothesize that humans have an internal
physics model that allows them to understand and predict
how an action will affect an object and use a siamese CNN to
model a similar understanding. And in [90] the authors start
with a base-net that branches out into nets specialized for
grasping, pushing, and pulling actions. The base-net provides
the basic processing of the visual input and then receives
feedback from the specialized nets on how to improve. The
approach thus mimics the human visual processing in the
idea of general preprocessing and then specialization. [46]
explores haptic adjectives such as compressible or smooth
from the fusion of visual and haptic data. For a thorough
review on interactive perception and further arguments for
actionbased perception see [17].
We also saw that human grasping is highly dependent on
context and task. Research has shown that the brain generates
different representations of an object depending on which
task or context we view it in. Robotic grasping research,
on the other hand, has traditionally focused on analytical
measures of grasp stability disregarding context and task
e.g. [14]. With an increased availability of grasping data and
tools for 3D vision, research has moved towards data-driven
grasping approaches. These methods rely in general on
matching features on the object to good hand configurations
where they measure good according to heuristics, matching
to stored grasp-feature relations, or minimizing a machine
learning loss function [18].
Even though these data-driven approaches have been suc-
cessful they have failed to broach the broader subject of
how object understanding and intention affects how an
agent should and can manipulate objects. Grasp synthesis
algorithms can heavily reduce the infinite number of grasping
positions on an object that it needs to consider by taking task
into account; as there is a limited set of positions for grasping
an object to complete a task successfully. Humans utilize this
strategy of optimizing post-grasp control sometimes placing
an initial awkward grasp to optimize for the end-goal.
A handful of efforts have incorporated task in robotic grasp-
ing. [110] trained a Bayesian Network (BN) relating object
properties with task, grasp, and constraint features. From
the BN they could produce probabilistic maps of hand pose
over the object conditioned on the task and object properties.
[87] formulated a probabilistic model over task, stability, and
known object models to find stable grasps. [56], [31] modu-
larized grasping into two modules one focused on matching
known grips to local properties on the object while the other
computed the task probability for a gripper position given
known task-specific grasps. The modularization enabled the
transfer of grasps and task constraints to novel object task
combinations. [6], [67] leveraged deep learning to generalize
task-constraints given by pixel-wise ground-truths denoting
affordance bearing parts.
In addition to task-based priors, we saw that humans use
priors based on material, size, and shape together with
sensorimotor memory adaptation when priors are wrong. To
the best of our knowledge, only [57] has approached the
problem of learning priors. [57] showed how a robot can
learn and utilize task-specific priors on object properties from
observed task-specific grasps by a human.
To conclude, feature work in computer vision and robotics
needs to have broader scopes in how they define vision.
Robotics research using vision-based approaches for action
needs to consider if methods developed for pure vision are
a good match for the action they want the robot to achieve
as primates show a preference for division and specialization
of labor. Robotic grasping research and perhaps robotics in
general needs to take a holistic approach to learning actions.
Actions do not exist in solitude but are part of a complex
behavioral machinery that contains many interdependent
parts that provide useful information about each other. If
roboticists can learn to incorporate these types of holistic
perspectives much will be won.
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